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1 |  INTRODUCTION
In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2013), Williamson argues that the traditional modal debate 
between actualists and possibilists is irredeemably unclear. He admits that the non- traditional debate 
about David Lewis’s (1986) metaphysics of modality is clear, but he thinks that that debate is simply 
irrelevant to modality as correctly understood. So, he argues, we should abandon the traditional 
actualist- possibilist debate and get on with the clearer contingentism- necessitism debate instead.1
In what follows, we argue that Williamson’s pessimism is not warranted by the brief arguments he 
gives. We argue that there is a clear understanding of the traditional modal debate which can, in fact, 
be formulated in terms Williamson himself provides (and which he has in fact briefly and hesitantly 
offered himself), which is not vulnerable to Williamson’s criticisms.
In Section 2, we explain the understanding of the traditional modal debate we propose, emphasising, 
as Williamson does, the difference from the debate as understood as one about Lewisean metaphysics.
Then, in Section 3, we go on to consider Williamson’s arguments for the irredeemable obscurity of 
this debate and argue that they are unconvincing.
 1Necessitism is the thesis that necessarily, everything is necessarily something, and contingentism is its denial. Williamson 
states this thesis in the language of first- order modal logic. We won’t have much to say about this view in what follows. We 
accept that the necessitism- contingentism debate is a clear one. Our focus is on the actualism- possibilism debate, which 
Williamson alleges is unclear.
Received: 12 January 2021 | Accepted: 11 January 2021
DOI: 10.1111/phil.12283  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
Critical note on Williamson: A defence of the 
actualism- possibilism debate
Benjamin L. Curtis1 |   Harold W. Noonan2
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2021 The Authors. The Philosophical Forum published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
1Department of Philosophy, Nottingham 
Trent University, Nottingham, UK
2Department of Philosophy, University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Correspondence
Benjamin L. Curtis, Nottingham Trent 
University, UK.
Email: benjamin.curtis@ntu.ac.uk
In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Williamson ar-
gues that the traditional actualist- possibilist debate should 
be abandoned as hopelessly unclear and that we should get 
on with the clearer contingentism- necessitism debate. We 
think that Williamson’s pessimism is not warranted by the 
brief arguments he gives. In this paper, we explain why 
and provide a clear formulation of the traditional actualist- 
possibilist debate.
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2 |  THE ACTUALIST- POSSIBILIST DEBATE
Actualism is the thesis that everything is actual, that there are no non- actual things. Possibilism is its 
denial, the thesis that there are. But how are to understand this debate? There is a clear conceptual 
framework and definition of ‘actual’ introduced by Lewis in terms of which a debate so named can be 
understood. But we agree with Williamson’s contention that the debate framed in such terms does not 
allow us to capture what is at issue in the traditional modal debate between actualists and possibilists.
The basic reason why the Lewisean framework does not capture the traditional modal debate is 
because it does not allow the definition of any sort of thing in modal terms. There are donkeys, he 
thinks, and there are donkeys that are non- actual, but ‘possible donkey’, that is, ‘thing which is possi-
bly a donkey’ does not, in his framework, define any sort of thing. This is because, according to Lewis, 
de re modal predication is inconstant.2 By contrast, the traditional, non- Lewisean, conception of the 
actualist- possibilist debate precisely presupposes that sorts of things can be defined in modal terms, 
and the debate is precisely about whether there are any things of a particular, modally defined, sort. 
So, setting aside Lewis’s framework and definition, the key question to ask about the traditional modal 
debate is: what sort?
What is in dispute between the traditional actualist and possibilist is the truth- value of a proposi-
tion of the form ‘there are merely possible Fs’. So, our question ‘What sort?’ is the question: what is 
the appropriate reading of ‘F’ in this proposition?
On the traditional non- Lewisean understanding of modality, ‘merely possible red thing’, ‘thing that 
is not a red thing but could have been’, is a perfectly well- defined sort. So is ‘merely possible don-
key’. But the debate between actualists and possibilists is not about whether there are things of these 
sorts, and depending on their background views of modality, actualists and possibilists might agree or 
disagree. Consider, for example, actualists who hold a non- standard background view about essential 
properties, viz. that there are none. Such actualists would agree with possibilists that there are merely 
possible red things, for example, unpainted British post- boxes. And such actualists would agree with 
possibilists that there are merely possible donkeys too. So traditional actualists and possibilists must 
have in in view a more general modally definable sort. But how can this be illuminatingly explained?
The obvious answer that comes to mind is that the sort in question is: merely possible concrete 
object. The actualists mentioned above will accept the existence of merely possible red things, like 
unpainted British post- boxes, because they think that there are concrete things– – not merely possibly 
concrete things, but concrete things– – that could have been, but are not, red things. They will also ac-
cept the existence of merely possible donkeys because they think that there are concrete things– – not 
merely possibly concrete things, but concrete things– – that could have been, but are not, donkeys (e.g., 
they may hold that some horse (or indeed, post- box) is not, but could have been, a donkey).
But how is ‘merely possible concrete thing’ to be explained? Of course, the concept inherits all 
the obscurity of the concept ‘concrete thing’. We will take it that the idea at the heart of the concept 
is that of an occupant of space or time, or both (the disjunction is to allow for unextended Cartesian 
substances). So, we take the modally defined sort in terms of which the traditional actualist- possibilist 
debate can be identified to be: merely possible occupant of space or time or both (but we will often 
 2That is, the reference of a modal predicate is dependent on context. Lewis explains this inconstancy in terms of his modal 
realist counterpart- theoretical understanding of modal predication but emphasises that it can be accepted independently (see 
Lewis, 1986, §4.5). One who does accept it without accepting the Lewisean metaphysical view is Bricker (2006). Bricker is, 
in fact, a modal realist, but he does not share Lewis’s indexical account of actuality, which is a central feature of Lewis’s 
framework. However, he emphatically endorses the inconstancy of de re modal predication.
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just write ‘merely possible concrete thing’ since it does not matter for our purposes whether a better 
understanding of the concrete is available).
So, we say, the traditional, non- Lewisean, modal debate, is between actualists, who deny the exis-
tence of merely possible occupants of space or time and possibilists, who affirm it.
But why do possibilists affirm it? Why do they say, to use an example that Williamson gives, that 
there are merely possible knives, entities that are not concrete entities (like lumps of metal that could 
have a knife form impressed upon them), not occupants of space or time, but could have been, because 
they could have been knives?
An argument for this is that there are modal truths which cannot be accounted for without reference 
to these things. Williamson gives the following illustration. You are going to assemble knives from 
interchangeable handles and interchangeable blades, but you never get round to it. You have three 
handles and three blades. So, nine merely possible knives. In particular, there is the merely possible 
knife that would have been assembled if handle one and blade three had been combined. This is not 
identical with the pair of the handle and the blade. If it had been made it would have been a concrete 
object, but the pair would not have been a concrete object. Nor is the possible knife the mereological 
sum of the handle and the blade. If the knife had been made it would have been constituted by the 
sum, but not identical with it. So, it is not in fact identical with it. How then can we account for the 
truth that nine possible knives could have been made without acknowledging the existence of merely 
possibly concrete objects?
So if the traditional actualist- possibilist debate is about whether there are merely possible concrete 
objects how is ‘actual’ to be understood?
Actualist affirm that everything is actual and they deny what possibilists affirm. But actualists 
are not, as such, nominalists. As well as concrete objects they can believe in abstract objects, such 
as numbers. To accommodate this we can understand ‘is actual’ to mean ‘is an occupant of space or 
time or both, or necessarily not’, or ‘not contingently non- concrete’ or ‘chunky’, as Williamson puts 
it (2013, p. 314). Williamson, discussing an extra thesis that a contingentist might hold, in fact writes 
(using ‘C’ for his predicate ‘chunky’):
[W]e might read Cx as x is not contingently non- concrete … the envisaged contingentists 
hold that necessarily everything is chunky (a claim vaguely reminiscent of actualism). 
(Williamson, 2013, p. 314)
We object only to the ‘vaguely’. Such a contingentist is an actualist.
This definition of ‘actual’ will serve for the present. Shortly, we shall see that a tweak is desir-
able to accommodate possibilists who want to acknowledge not only merely possible concrete things, 
which could be actual but are not, but also impossibilia, in the sense of things that could not be actual. 
But with the understanding of the traditional debate we now have we can turn to Williamson’s argu-
ments that no clarification of the traditional distinction is possible and that it should be jettisoned. 
Our position is that the clarification of the distinction just given (plus the promised tweak) withstands 
Williamson’s arguments.
3 |  OBJECTIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL DISTINCTION
Williamson first points out that if actualists say that their position is that everything is actual they need 
to explain what they mean by ‘is actual’. And they cannot do so by saying that to be actual is to be 
in the actual world, since ‘is in the actual world’ is more obscure than ‘is actual’. We agree entirely.
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David Lewis does better, says Williamson, for Lewis explains ‘is actual’ in entirely non- modal 
terms as the indexical ‘is part of our spatio- temporal system’ (or outside any such system– – he admits 
things which are actual by ‘courtesy’, like numbers). Lewisean realists hold that that there are things 
outside our spatio- temporal system and that this is a consequence of familiar modal truths, for exam-
ple, that there could have been, but actually are not, talking donkeys. These merely possible things do 
not interact with us (they are not our ‘world mates’), but they interact with one another. Merely pos-
sible talking donkeys are talking donkeys, they are just not, in a sense, ‘here’. But Williamson rejects 
this explanation as irrelevant to the traditional actualist- possibilist debate, which is supposed to be one 
about which opponents of Lewis can intelligibly disagree. Again, we agree entirely.
Williamson then notes that if to be actual is explained simply as to actually be, actualism becomes 
trivial, since the adverb ‘actually’ on the standard account is a modal operator which makes a differ-
ence to truth- value only when in the scope of another modal operator. Again, we agree.
So, Williamson says, ‘the actualist needs another understanding of “is actual” than the one pro-
vided in modal logic …’. Again, we agree that the traditional (non- Lewisean) actualist needs one and 
have provided one above, in line with what Williamson himself tentatively suggests. But Williamson 
then continues, to deliver what he seems to regard as the killing blow. It is here, if anywhere, that 
Williamson’s objection to our proposal is located. Williamson writes:
… On the supposed alternative reading, being actual had better be actually doing some-
thing harder than just being otherwise the supposed distinction is silly. But what is that 
harder thing, if a dispute about whether everything does it is as fundamental to modal 
metaphysics as the dispute between actualism and possibilism is supposed to be? And 
why should the alternative to the view that everything actually does the harder thing to 
be a view on which everything could do the harder thing? Why cannot something be 
impossible, in the sense that it could not do the harder thing? (Williamson, 2013, p. 23)
We find this puzzling and do not see that it refutes our proposal. At worst, it requires the tweak already 
promised to accommodate possibilists who want to acknowledge impossibilia. But this can easily be 
made.
The task for the defenders of the significance of the traditional distinction is to define ‘is actual’ in 
a way that does not make trivially obvious the statement that everything is actual, otherwise the debate 
is silly. In this sense they must so define it that being actual has to be conceptually harder than just 
being. There are three points to make here.
First, defenders of the significance of the traditional distinction do not have to define being actual 
as ‘actually doing something harder than just being’, as Williamson says they do, since the adverb 
‘actually’ here is just the one standardly employed within modal logic, and so redundant here since 
not within the scope of modal operators. A definition of being actual as ‘doing something harder than 
just being’ is enough (we do not have to define ‘is a bachelor’ as ‘is actually male and unmarried’). 
Perhaps this is just a slip.
Second, as already in effect noted, it is not a necessary condition of a significant definition of ‘is 
actual’ that it ensure that being actual is doing something, not merely conceptually, but metaphysically 
harder than being. In fact, actualists will say that it is not; there is no possibility of being without being 
actual. But that is not a conceptual triviality.
Third, defenders of the significance of the traditional debate, if they accept the definition of ‘is 
actual’ we have given, can explain why on the possibilist view (i.e. ‘the alternative to the view that 
everything actually does the harder thing’) everything could be actual (‘could do the harder thing’). 
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If actual things are defined as those in space or time or necessarily not, actualism is the thesis that 
everything is an occupant of space or time or is necessarily not. So, the opposing possibilist position 
is that there are things not in space or time which could be. Possibilists, so understood, recognise the 
possibility of three types of entity: as well as the possibility of (i) things in space or time and (ii) things 
necessarily not involved in space or time, they recognise the possibility of (iii) things not in space or 
time which could be. Entities of type (i) are actual, a fortiori possibly actual; so are entities of type (ii) 
by the disjunct in the definition which certifies numbers as actual; and entities of type (iii), since they 
could be in space or time are also possibly actual. So it is no more mysterious, with ‘actual’ defined as 
we have defined it, that everything is at least possibly actual than it is mysterious, if ‘rouge’ is defined 
as ‘red or necessarily not red’, that everything is at least possibly rouge.
But it may be said that it is a defect of the definition given that it ensures that necessarily every-
thing is at least possibly actual, since the possibilist need not accept this. He might think that there 
are impossibilia, in the sense of things that could not be actual. Consider an irresistible force and an 
immovable object, or an everlasting omnipotent, omnibenevolent god and an everlasting omnipotent, 
omnimalevolent devil. According to the possibilist the god and the devil are both among the things 
there are. Each could be an occupant of space or time, and so each could be actual (and perhaps one 
is). But they could not both be occupants of space or time. So, their pair is necessarily not in space or 
time. The same is true of their mereological sum. So these, like the number 9 and for the same reason, 
are actual (and a fortiori possibly actual). But should the possibilist say that something is actual whose 
members or proper parts are non- actual? It sounds odd.
On the contrary, it seems equally odd to say that the number nine is actual given that it is metaphys-
ically prohibited from spatial or temporal occupation. But actualists must say this, at least if they are 
not nominalists. And there is an argument that the pair and the sum are more worthy of the designation 
‘actual’ than the number: they, unlike it, at least have members/parts which are possible occupants of 
space or time, hence, possibly actual. We therefore do not think this is a fatal objection to the defini-
tion of ‘is actual’ we have given.
But we may wish to say the pair or the sum is an object which could not be actual, is something 
which neither does the ‘harder thing’ nor could. However, the definition of ‘actual’ given can be 
tweaked to yield this result, thus answering we think the objection in the rhetorical questions at the 
end of the passage quoted from Williamson. This can be done in two ways.
First, we can say that it is not a sufficient condition of something’s being actual that it be incapable 
of spatial or temporal occupation, but that it is a sufficient condition that it be incapable of spatial or 
temporal occupation and lack members or parts contingently not in space or time. With this tweak we 
can still say that the number nine is actual, but deny that the pair, or sum, is even possibly actual. Or, 
second, if we want to class the pair, as an abstract object, with numbers and distinguish them from 
the sum, we can say that it is not a sufficient condition of something’s being actual that it is incapable 
of spatial or temporal occupation, but that it is a sufficient condition that it is incapable of spatial or 
temporal occupation and lacks parts contingently not in space or time.
Either tweak to the definition allows the possibilists to say that there are things that are not actual 
which are not even possibly actual, which do not do ‘the harder thing’ and could not, and in this sense 
are impossibilia.
But on either tweak the point of dispute between the actualist and possibilist remains the same and 
can be stated without the word ‘actual’: are there things which are not in space or time but could have 
been? For there are such things as the sum and the pair of the god and devil only if the latter two both 
exist, and at least one of these must be a non- occupant of space or time, and so non- actual, though 
each could be.
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We think, therefore, that Williamson’s objections to the intelligibility of the traditional, that 
is, non- Lewisean, actualist- possibilist debate can be met on the proposal outlined by us. We note, 
however, that the intelligibility of this debate does depend on the rejection of the inconstancy of 
modal predication, and as noted in footnote 2, one might accept this, even if not a Lewisean modal 
realist.
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